This paper obtains an evolving pattern of goods market integration in Russia, considering the period of economic upturn, since the second half of 2000 through the end of 2007. In an integrated market, the price of a tradable good at any location is determined by the national market, not local demand. Based on this, the strength of dependence of local prices on local demands is used to detect and measure market segmentation. The costs of a staples basket across almost all Russian regions with a monthly frequency are used as the empirical stuff. The pattern obtained suggests that in the time span under consideration the degree of Russia's goods market integration was relatively stable, fluctuating around some level; no sufficient improvements or deteriorations were detected.
INTRODUCTION
Two fundamentally different stages can be distinguished in the economic development of contemporary Russia. Since the beginning of 1990s, economic recession took place in the country. Following some time after the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia it changed to upturn. The issue of goods market integration in Russia in the first stage was of great interest for economists. Berkowitz, DeJong and Husted (1998) , Berkowitz and DeJong (1999 , 2001 , 2003 , de Masi and Koen (1996) , Gardner and Brooks (1994) , Goodwin, Grennes, and McCurdy (1999) , and Phillips (1992, 1993 ) analyzed this issue, using different product and location samples as well as time spans and exploiting various methodologies. Their findings can be summarized as follows. In the early years of transition, segmentation of the Russian goods markets increased, whereupon, about the middle of 1990s, a turn for the improvement of integration started. Such a pattern is the most pronounced in Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) and Gluschenko (2003) , who estimated integration trajectories, i.e. time series of a degree of integration. From the latter paper, one can believe that by 1999 or 2000 the integration of the Russian goods market reached some practically achievable maximal degree, and so, it would be more or less stable from that time on. Unfortunately, no paper on market integration in Russia in the stage of economic upturn has appeared, and so, it is still a question whether such a belief is true. This paper fills the gap, analyzing the evolution of market integration in the country in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . It uses a methodology put forward in Gluschenko (2003 Gluschenko ( , 2004 that is based on the following idea. The market is deemed integrated if the law of one price holds in it, controlling for transportation costs. Hence, in an integrated market, the price of a tradable good at any location is determined by the national market, and not by local demand. Otherwise the strength of dependence of local price on local demand measures market segmentation (or, conversely, integration: the smaller the segmentation, the higher the integration). To make such a relationship operational, it is transformed to that between local price and local income per capita.
Running cross-sectional estimations of the degree of segmentation/integration for each available point in time, an integration trajectory is obtained, thus providing the temporal pattern of market integration. The cost of a staples basket is used as a goods price index. The data cover almost all regions in Russia, and span the period June 2000 up to December 2007 at a monthly frequency.
In fact, this paper is a sequel to Gluschenko (2003) 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Here is a brief restatement of the methodology used for assessing the degree of market integration in Gluschenko (2003 Gluschenko ( , 2004 :
Consider a market for a tradable good consisting of a great number of spatially separated sub-markets (regions of the country) {r}. Taking all variables as logarithms, let P r be the price of the good in region r, I r the per capita income, Q r = D(P r , I r ) the demand function (assuming I r is the only determinant of demand apart from price), and Q r = S(P r ) the supply function. (Local quantities are negligibly small compared to their total across all regions.) Regions are linked by arbitrageurs (also supposed to be numerous) so that no monopolistic effects occur, even if the good is not produced in some regions. By moving the good to or from the region, arbitrageurs 5 adjust the quantity supplied in it when the local price increases or decreases due to changes in local demand (e.g., because of variations in per capita income).
A market is deemed integrated when such an adjustment leads prices to equalize across regions so that the law of one price holds. Perfect integration implies there are no impediments to the movement of the good between regions, and the market operates like a single perfectly competitive market. Thus, the price of the good at any region is determined by the national market, not local demand. From the viewpoint of an individual region, the supply curve S is perfectly elastic. The presence of impediments to inter-region trade causes the market to be segmented. These impediments are quantified as arbitrage transaction costs C rs needed to move a unit of the good between s and r. In the segmented market, prices differ across regions, resulting in a dependence of local prices on local demand.
From the above considerations, it follows that the dependence of local prices on local demand could be used to detect and measure market segmentation. However, data on quantities demanded are, as a rule, unavailable. Therefore, it is more convenient to derive a relationship between prices and incomes as a testable version. Taking a single region r, the equilibrium condition in its market
yields P r = f(I r ). It is important to note that while demand D(P r , I r ) is a local one, supply S(P r ) is not that of local producers only, being formed jointly by producers from all regions through the inter-region arbitrage. It is this that makes S(P r ) to be a horizontal line when there are no market frictions, or something like a logistic curve in the presence of impediments to arbitrage.
With some additional assumptions, f(I r ) can be represented as a log-linear function
Thus, β = dP r /dI r . As (1) holds for each I r , the derivative of its left-hand side with respect to I r equals zero. From this we obtain
where ε I is the income elasticity of demand, and ε D and ε S are the price elasticities of demand and supply. It follows from (3) that β ≥ 0. With finite ε S , β is positive. However, β = 0 in a perfectly integrated market, i.e. β vanishes as supply approaches perfect elasticity (ε S → ∞).
Subtracting (2) for some region s from that for r, an equation in terms of percentage 6 differentials, P rs ≡ P r -P s , I rs ≡ I r -I s , is arrived at (throughout the paper, r and s are arranged so that P rs ≥ 0):
Although (4) is a pairwise comparison, the region pair, r and s, is not dealt with in isolation. The rest of regions act "behind the scene," forming supplies in r and s, and so, influencing on the value of β.
Thus, relationship (4) can be used as a cross-sectional test for market segmentation. A positive value of β indicates that regional markets are not perfectly integrated. The magnitude of β (the elasticity of price dispersion vis-à-vis income dispersion) can be used as a measure of the degree of market segmentation/integration: a higher value for β means weaker integration (or higher segmentation). If β = 0 holds over a set {(r, s)}, implying the law of one price holds, then the relevant market can be deemed integrated.
To control for transportation costs, T rs , the price differentials should be cleaned from them (so using a weaker version of the law of one price): P rs -T rs = βI rs or P rs = βI rs + T rs . By assuming transportation costs to be log-linear function of distance, T rs = α + γL rs , the following equation is arrived at:
where L rs is log distance separating regions r and s. Taking into account random shocks, ε rs , we obtain an econometric version of (5):
This regression is estimated over a set of N×(N-1)/2 region pairs; N is the number of regions.
The subjects of the Russian Federation are taken as regions. An exception is autonomous okrugs (districts) that are parts of different subjects of the federation, oblasts or krais, being at the same time separate subjects of the federation and possessing equal rights with other ones. Therefore, arbitrage cannot be bilateral there, goods being imported only in these regions.
Obviously, difficult access to a number of regions worsens integration of the national market.
And so, eliminating such regions is equivalent to controlling for this "natural" impediment to integration. This subsample contains 71 regions (2,485 pairwise observations).
Another subsample represents the European part of Russia excluding its northern territories; it is hereafter referred to as simply "European Russia;" there are 52 regions in this subsample. Since the transport infrastructure is more developed in this part of the country, and distances are shorter, it seems that European Russia have to be more integrated than the remainder of the country without difficult-to-access regions. However, the results of Gluschenko (2003) As mentioned in the Introduction, the price data in this paper differ from those used in Gluschenko (2003) . First, the old basket included 25 foods; coinciding goods have different quantities in the baskets of 25 and 33 foods. Appendix 1 provides comparison of these baskets.
Second, the cost of the old basket was that in only the capital city of a region (while income represented the whole region, like in this paper). Unlike this, the cost of the new basket is that 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Let us first take a look at unconditional relationships presented in Figure 1 . Prices and incomes in the figure are normalized to those for the whole of Russia (the latter are weighted averages over all regions) and geometrically averaged over 2000:6 through 2007:12. In real terms, the range of prices is 0.85 to 2.97 of the national average (thus, the prices differ across Russian regions up to 3.5-fold); the range of per capita incomes is 0.29 to 3.41 (i.e., the cross-regional difference of nominal incomes amounts to 11.8 times). The distance in Figure 1 that year, a wave of significant rise in prices, both wholesale (producers' and importers') and retail, for many foods started; this rise was not concerted, again, with local demands. Thus, such outliers hardly evidence real changes in market integration; they rather can be deemed as noisy deviations from an "actual" integration trajectory.
Some other local changes in the trajectories can also be believed as noise. The point is that food prices in Russia are very mobile over high inflation (across 2001-2007 , the cost of the staples basket rose by 7.6 to 18.8 percent per year; in 2007, the rise amounted to 22.3 percent).
Sometimes (or/and in some regions), the prices change faster than demand, which is captured by the model as transient strengthening or weakening of the price-income dependence, hence, as a change of the degree of market integration.
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Thus, it makes sense to smooth integration trajectories for somehow eliminating noisy deviations. Figure 4 reports integration trajectories smoothed through a moving average β * t = 0.1β t-2 + 0.2β t-1 + 0.4β t + 0.2β t+1 + 0.1β t+2 . These trajectories look more reasonable than those in Figure 3 from the intuitive viewpoint. Some noise seems to be still present in the trajectories; nevertheless, it is obvious that further smoothing would leave the trajectories to be bumpy in the Turning back to Figure 1 , much stronger dependence of prices on incomes is seen in difficult-to-access regions, particularly, in the Chukot Autonomous Okrug. Because of this feature, the overall degree of segmentation of the Russian market is overstated. Another feature is the seeming lack of the price-income dependence in the Republic of Ingushetia, which leads to understatement of the degree of segmentation. To control for these features, model (6) is augmented 15 for two relevant dummies. The difficult access dummy is constructed as d Table 2 compares means and standard deviations of price differential across the two baskets. Both baskets provide almost the same pattern of price dispersion. For the most part, the relevant summary statistics are close or even coincide; the maximal difference does not exceed 7 percent. Thus, from the viewpoint of price dispersion, both baskets can be deemed as equivalent. When the case in hands is the 33-food basket, the Russian market turns out to be more segmented than indicated by estimates based on the 25-food basket. Taking the entire 7-month span, β increases by about a quarter in Russia as a whole, and by a half in the country excluding difficult-to-access regions. However, the increase is less than 10 percent in European Russia. As a rule, the dependence of price differential on distance is slightly weaker for the 33-food basket (although the pattern is vague in European Russia; the entire-span estimate of γ suggests that it is stronger). Anyway, γs are little affected, for the most part, by the change of the basket.
The reason of the rise in βs with the new basket seems to be a wider spatial coverage rather than changes in commodity coverage and quantities of goods. Recall that the cost of the old basket is that in the capital city of a region, while income is for the entire region. Due to this, the dependence of prices on incomes seems weaker than actual. For example, the Tyumen Oblast is the second in Russia according to ranking by incomes per capita, while the prices in the city of In the early years of market reforms in the country, market segmentation rose dramatically.
Then, beginning about the end of 1994, integration started to improve (this process being broken for some time by the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia and preceding events that caused it).
The improvement came to the end by 1999 in Russia as a whole and excluding difficult-to-access regions, and a year after in European Russia, when market integration stabilized at territoryspecific levels. Taking account of the difference between the price data used for obtaining the 
